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Admiralty
by Thomas S. Rue*
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided fourteen
admiralty cases with written opinions in 1996. Four of the decided cases
involved issues of first impression. Of the cases involving issues of first
impression, one considered the tension between a shipowner's right to a
nonjury trial in admiralty of its right to limitation of liability and the
damage claimants' right to a jury trial in a forum of their choice.1 In
that case, the Eleventh Circuit allowed a multiple-claims-inadequatefund case to be transformed into the functional equivalent of a single
claim case, thereby creating another exception to the shipowner's right
to a concursus.2 In another case, a subcontractor who asserted a
maritime lien against a public vessel persuaded the Eleventh Circuit
that the lien claim fell outside the scope of the Public Vessels Act3 and
was therefore subject to the Suits in Admiralty Act,4 allowing the
recovery of interest.5 In yet another case, the Eleventh Circuit became
the first court of appeals to approve the use of self-help remedies in
preferred mortgage foreclosures.' In the last case of first impression,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the Suits in Admiralty Act bars a
of maintenance and cure against an
seaman's suit for willful denial
7
agent of the United States.

* Partner in the firm of Johnstone, Adams, Bailey, Gordon & Harris, L.L.C., Mobile,
Alabama. University of the South (B.A., cum laude, 1968); University of Alabama (J.D.,
1974). Member, Editorial Board, Alabama Law Review (1972-1974). Member, Board of
Directors, The Maritime Law Association of the United States (1993-1996); Member, Board
of Governors, Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute (1983-1985); Member, American Bar
Association and Alabama State Bar Association.
1. Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1996).
2. Id. at 1039.

3. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (1994).
4. Id. §§ 741-752.
5. Marine Coatings of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1996).
6. Dietrich v. Key Bank, N.A., 72 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1996).
7. Kasprik v. United States, 87 F.3d 462 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Although the remaining cases were not cases of first impression, some
of them amplified existing law. For instance, in its first application of
Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit took
occasion to define admiralty jurisdiction as encompassing the repair,
conversion, and maintenance aboard a vessel in navigable waters.' In
the lone cargo case decided by the Eleventh Circuit, it elaborated on
when the terms of the bill of lading establish prima facie proof that the
carrier received the goods as described in the bill of lading.1 0 In a
limitation of liability case, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed precedent
from the old Fifth Circuit constituting a fourth exception to a shipowner's right to a concursus in admiralty." The one case involving
marine insurance dealt with a "held covered" clause. 2 The remaining
decisions were of a garden variety and did not change existing law in
this circuit.
I. ADMIPALTY JURISDICTION
In Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc.,"8 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the question of whether an injury to a carpenter assisting in
the installation of an elevator aboard a vessel docked in navigable
waters of south Florida, where it was being converted from an oildrilling vessel to a fish-processing vessel, involved a maritime tort.1 '
The carpenter slipped in oil that had leaked from a codfish heading
machine. After the carpenter filed suit in state court, the suit was
removed to a federal court based upon diversity and admiralty jurisdiction.' 5
The district court found that the incident was a maritime tort and
granted summary judgment for the vessel on the ground "that the suit
was time barred because it had not been filed within the applicable
three-year statute of limitations."" In reaching its decision, the district
court relied upon Sisson v. Ruby 7 and Kelly v. Smith." After the

8. 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
9. Alderman v. Pacific N. Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d 1061, 1065 (11th Cir. 1996).
10. Plastique Tags, Inc. v. Asia Trans Line, Inc., 83 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1996).
11. Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Shubert, 86 F.3d 1060 (11th Cir. 1996).
12. Hilton Oil Transp. v. Jonas, 75 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 1996).
13. 95 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 1996).
14. Id. at 1063.
15. Id.
16. Id. The statue of limitation is found in 46 U.S.C. app. § 763(a) (1994), which
provides: "Unless otherwise specified by law, a suit for recovery of damages for personal
injury or death, or both, arising out of a maritime tort, shall not be maintained unless
commenced within three years from the date the cause of action accrued."
17. 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
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district court had rendered its decision, the United States Supreme
Court decided Grubart u. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.1 and
specifically rejected the test set forth in Kelly.20
In applying Grubart, the Eleventh Circuit set forth the elements
necessary to invoke admiralty jurisdiction: "the activity from which the
claim arises must satisfy a location test and it must have sufficient
The location test was satisfied
connection with maritime activity."
22
when both parties agreed that the tort occurred on navigable waters.
The Eleventh Circuit then found that the connection test raises two
issues.' The first is "whether the incident has 'a potentially disruptive
impact on maritime commerce, ' "2 and the second is "whether 'the
general character' of the 'activity giving rise to the incident' shows a
'substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.'"26
The carpenter erroneously relied on the fact that there had been no
actual impact of the incident upon maritime commerce. 26 The Eleventh
Circuit was careful to point out that its "focus is not on what actually
happened, but upon the potential effects of what could happen."2 7 In
other words, the court had to consider "whether the incident could be
seen within a class of incidents that posed more than a fanciful risk to
commercial shipping." 8 The Eleventh Circuit described the general
features of the accident "as an onboard injury which occurred during the
From there the
repair, maintenance or conversion of a vessel."
Eleventh Circuit proceeded to find that "[ulnsafe working conditions
aboard a vessel under repairs, maintenance, or conversion, therefore,
pose a potentially disruptive impact upon maritime commerce. ""'
In addressing the second prong of the test, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the carpenter's assertion that he was merely a construction
worker and that, therefore, the accident was not a maritime tort." The
Eleventh Circuit held that "[tihe work of the injured plaintiff does not

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
95 F.3d at 1063.
1d. at 1064.
Id.
Id.

24. Id. (quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362-64 & n.2, and Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1048).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Grubart,116 S. Ct. at 1051).

Id.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 1065.
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determine whether there is a substantial relationship to maritime
activity. 32 The court quoted Grubart and said that the focus is
"'whether a tortfeasor's activity, commercial or noncommercial, on
navigable waters is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to
admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules
would apply in the case at hand.'" Before considering the activities
of the tortfeasor, the Eleventh Circuit noted that its "examination of the
actions of the tortfeasor should be given a 'broad perspective."''
The
Eleventh Circuit then observed that the parameters of the "relevant
activity" of the tortfeasor are not the discrete circumstances surrounding
the incident in question, but the general conduct out of which the
incident arose.8" Applying that standard to the activity of the tortfeasor in the case, the Eleventh Circuit found that converting an oildrilling vessel to a fish-processing
vessel was substantially related to
36
activity,
maritime
traditional
The court broadened the holding beyond the dictates of the case by
stating, "[Wie believe that conversions, repairs, or maintenance aboard
a vessel in navigable water are substantially related to traditional
maritime activity. Work upon ships at sea or docked in navigable
waterways is an indispensable maritime activity. It is essential to the
continued productive use of those vessels." 7 Once the court determined
that admiralty jurisdiction applied with the application of substantive
admiralty law, the Eleventh Circuit held that the incident was a marine
tort and time barred under the applicable three-year statute of
limitations.8
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
In Central State Transit & Leasing Corp. v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc.,39
the Eleventh Circuit decided whether summary judgment against the
vessel owner on the question of damages for the loss of 'use was
appealable.4' In this case, the owner of a motor yacht initially sought
recovery for damage to its vessel while it was being raised out of the
water on a floating drydock manufactured by one defendant and owned

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. (quoting Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1051).
Id. (quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 366-67).
Id. (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364-66).
Id.
Id.

38. Id. at 1065-66. The court reviewed de novo whether substantive admiralty law
applied. Id. at 1063.
39. 77 F.3d 376 (11th Cir. 1996).
40. 1d at 376.
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and operated by another defendant."' When the vessel owner amended
its complaint to add a claim for damages for loss of use, both defendants
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the claim for loss of
use.42 In granting the motion, the district court noted that the vessel
was documented and insured as a pleasure vessel; therefore, the owner
had not lost any profits while the vessel was being repaired.' After
the district court denied the owner's timely motion to alter or amend, the
vessel owner filed the appeal."
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that
the partial summary judgment was "not appealable because it does not
resolve the principal liability issue between the parties in this case.""
In deciding the issue, the Eleventh Circuit noted the proper standard
that "ltlo be appealable, however, the order must have 'the effect of
ultimately determining the rights and obligations of the parties."'
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district' court had not decided
"whether either of the defendants is responsible for damage to the...
vessel." 7 In essence the district court's order struck the claim for
damages for loss of use but did not dispose of a separate claim for relief.
Thus, the court did not determine liability. Accordingly, the court of
appeals granted the motion to dismiss the appeal."'
III.

CARGO

The sole cargo case decided by the Eleventh Circuit was Plastique
Tags, Inc. v. Asia Trans Line, Inc.," in which the court decided when
a bill of lading is prima facie proof that the carrier received the cargo as
described therein. 0 In this case, the shipper contracted with Asia
Trans Line, Inc., for the carriage of one sealed container from Korea to
New York. Upon the representation of the shipper that there were
4,437,500 plastic bags in the container, Asia Trans Line issued a bill of
lading for the cargo that stated: "Shipper's Load & Count Said To
Contain: 5,600 boxes/4,437,500 ... plastic bags."8 ' Asia Trans Line,

41. Id. at 377.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 378 (quoting Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 564 (5th Cir. 1981)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 83 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1996).
50. Id. at 1367.
51. Id. at 1369.
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Inc. in turn contracted with DSR Senator Lines for carriage of the
container aboard the M/V Cho Yang World. Upon delivery of the sealed
container directly to Senator by the shipper, Senator issued its bill of
lading, the terms of which were identical in all material respects to those
of Asia Trans Line. When the vessel delivered the container to New
York, Senator released it with its seal intact to a trucking company that
transported the container to a customer of Plastique. After the customer
inventoried the container, it found 2,618,500 bags missing and refused
to pay for the shipment. This caused Plastique to bring suit for the
shortfall against the carriers but not the shipper. 2
The Eleventh Circuitbegan its analysis with a fundamental statement
of law from the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA")" that "a
shipper must prove that the goods were damaged or lost while in the
carrier's custody," which is usually done "by showing: 1) full delivery of
the goods in good condition to the carrier, and 2) outturn by the carrier
of the cargo with damaged or missing goods."
Plastique sought to
establish full delivery in good condition by means of the bill of lading,
which it claimed pursuant to COGSA was "'prima facie evidence of the
receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described."'55
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit set forth the general
rule: In order for a bill of lading to constitute prima facie proof that the
carrier received cargo consistent with the terms of the bill, it must either
be without limiting language such as "shipper's load and count" or it
must contain terms that the carrier can verify.5 The court elaborated
on the rule as follows: (1) If the bill of lading contains no limiting
language, it constitutes prima facie proof of each term and the carrier is
bound thereby; (2) If the bill of lading contains limiting language that
a term was supplied by the shipper and not checked by the carrier, the
carrier is not bound except when the term is easily verifiable by the
carrier.57 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the basis for the rule
was that "COGSA expressly states that a carrier shall not be bound to
include in the bill of lading a term which he has no reasonable means of
checking.""'
In applying the rule, the court found that the bill of lading did not
constitute prima facie proof of the terms because the bill of lading
contained limiting language, and one of the terms, the amount of goods
52. Id.
53.

46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1994).

54. 83 F.3d at 1369. *
55. Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(4)).
56. Id. at 1370.

57. Id.
58. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(3Xc)).
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in the sealed container, was not verifiable by the carrier."e Since the
bill of lading was the only ground upon which Plastique presented proof
of good delivery, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Plastique could not
show that the loss occurred while the cargo was in the carrier's
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
custody.'o
61
court.
IV.

IMMUNrTY

The Eleventh Circuit was presented with an interesting and novel
issue involving Eleventh Amendment immunity in Bouchard Transportation Co. v. FloridaDepartmentof EnvironmentalProtection." This case
arose when an oil spill into Florida's navigable waters occurred as a
result of the collision of two tug-barge flotillas and a freighter. Each of
the three vessel owners filed separate limitation of liability actions. An
agency of the State of Florida authorized to pursue oil pollution claims
on behalf of the state was served with notice to file its claims in all three
limitation actions. The agency filed answers and claims for affirmative
relief in all three limitation actions." In response, the tug owners filed
countercloseup claims against the agency, which then moved to dismiss
those limitation actions and counterclaims on the ground that the
Eleventh Amendments' prevented the vessel owners from bringing the
state agency into federal court." The district court failed to rule on the
agency's motions to dismiss but instead consolidated the limitation
actions and ordered the parties to mediate. The agency objected to the
court-ordered mediation on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Its objections
were overruled by the district court, which held that it "had inherent
power to order mediation.'e The appeal ensued.
Although the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the vessel owners that the
order of the district court did not address the Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the Eleventh Circuit decided that it had jurisdiction to review
the district court's order directing the agency to mediate. 7 According

59. Id.
60. Id. at 1370-71.
61. Id.
62. 91 F.3d 1445 (11th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 1447.
64. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
65. 91 F.3d at 1447.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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to the Eleventh Circuit, "a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is 'an
entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation."'
Since "[tihe order.., effectively denied [the agency] the right not to
participate in [the] litigation," the Eleventh Circuit had jurisdiction over
the appeal.0 9
On the merits of the appeal, the Eleventh Circuit declined to address
whether the agency was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for
the first time on appeal because the district court had not addressed that
issue.70 The court of appeals did reach the issue of mediation by
considering whether the district court had erred in ordering the agency
to mediate before ruling
71 on the agency's motions asserting Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
The Eleventh Circuit also raised the tangential issue of whether the
agency had adequately raised the issue that the district court had erred
by reserving a ruling on the agency's Eleventh Amendment immunity.7 2
Initially, the agency contended that the district court had ruled on and
denied Eleventh Amendment immunity. The issue of reserving a ruling
was first clearly raised at oral argument. The Eleventh Circuit noted
that "issues not discussed in a party's initial brief are deemed waived,
but we construe briefs liberally in determining the issues raised on
appeal."" Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit found that the agency had
"implicitly raised this issue in its initial brief by arguing that the
Eleventh Amendment deprived the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction to enter the mediation order."74
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court had
"held that Eleventh Amendment immunity is in the nature of a
jurisdictional bar."7 1 Since "Eleventh Amendment immunity ... is a
right to be free from the burdens of litigation," the court of appeals
believed that the issue should be decided at an early stage.76 The court
of appeals found that a purpose of the Eleventh Amendment "is to
protect states from the indignity of being haled into federal court by

68. Id. at 1448 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1449. The standard of review employed by the court was the abuse of
discretion standard. Id at 1448.
72. Id. at 1448 n.3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. If the Eleventh Amendment were jurisdictional per se, the court would have
to raise the issue sue sponte.
76. Id.
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private litigants" and that "[tihis purpose is not served when a ruling on
Eleventh Amendment immunity is unnecessarily postponed.""7
In vacating and remanding the case, the Eleventh Circuit narrowed
its holding (that "the district court abuses its discretion by reserving a
ruling on immunity and ordering the parties to mediate") to instances
in which the Eleventh Amendment issue "is a purely legal one." The
view of the Eleventh Circuit was that the district court had inherent
powers to manage its affairs, but such inherent powers could not be
exercised in disregard of the Constitution and its concerns.79 The
Eleventh Circuit correctly discerned that the mediation ordered by the
district court was unnecessary to the resolution of the Eleventh
Amendment issue."0
V. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
In American DredgingCo. v. Lambert,"' the Eleventh Circuit decided
a garden variety limitation of liability case involving nonseamen. The
case arose out of a nighttime allision in territorial waters near Miami.
In the very early hours of the morning, four individuals boarded a
motorboat and proceeded toward Fishermen's Channel where the Dredge
American was dredging with approximately one thousand feet of dredge
pipeline floating on top of the water."2 The pipeline had flashing yellow
lights, the number and location of which failed to meet 33 C.F.R.
§ 88.15.' In order to allow a barge and tug access to a dock blocked by
the dredge and its pipeline, a tug assisting the dredge divided the
pipeline and moved part of it away. This left the ends of the divided
pipeline without the required red lights.8 With the dredge and its
pipeline in that configuration, the motorboat approached at approximately thirty miles per hour and struck the dredge pipeline, killing three of
the occupants. The dredging company filed a petition seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Limitation of Liability
Act."8 The lone survivor and the three personal representatives of the

77. Id. at 1448-49.
78, Id. at 1449.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 81 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 1996).
82. Id. at 128-29.
83. Id. at 130.
84. Id. at 129 (referring to 33 C.F.R. § 88.15(b) (1996)).
85. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994). Section 183 provides in part:
The liability of the owner of any vessel ... for any loss, damage, or injury by
collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done,
occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge ofsuch owner or owners,
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decedents filed answers as claimants contesting the right to exoneration
from or limitation of liability and counterclaimed for pecuniary and
nonpecuniary damages as a result of the dredging company's negligent
operation' The district court granted the claimants' motion for summary
judgment, contending that the dredging company's negligence precluded
exoneration and limitation of liability. The district court denied the
dredging company's motion for partial summary judgment regarding the
recoverability of nonpecuniary damages."
The Eleventh Circuit began with a recitation of the general rule that
"[a] shipowner is entitled to exoneration from all liability for a maritime
collision only when it demonstrates that it is free from any contributory
fault.8 7 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the entitlement to limitation
is a two-step analysis: (1) determine "what acts of negligence or
conditions of unseaworthiness caused the accident" and (2) determine
"whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of those same acts of
negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.'Ms Regarding the first step
of the analysis, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's
determinations without comment but with tacit approval." The district
court concluded that the dredging company had violated statutory
regulations designed to prevent this type of accident.' ° That finding
required the application of The Pennsylvania Rule," whereupon the
district court found that the dredging company failed to produce
evidence that its negligence could not have been a cause of the accident." At that point, the district court concluded that the dredging
company "was negligent as a matter of law, that its negligence was a
proximate cause of the accident, and that it was not entitled to
exoneration from liability." 3
In addressing the second step of the analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that when a claimant proved negligence or unseaworthiness, the
burden of proof shifted to the shipowner to prove lack of privity or
shall not ... exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such
vessel, and her freight then pending.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a).
86. 81 F.3d at 129.
87. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. Id.
88. Id (quoting Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Fla., 768 F.2d 1558, 156364 (11th Cir. 1985)).
89. Id. at 129-30.
90. I& at 129.
91. The Pennsylvania Rule requires that a vessel guilty of statutory fault must prove
that its fault could not have contributed to the collision in order to avoid liability. The
Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
92. 81 F.3d at 130.
93. Id.
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knowledge.'4 Lack of actual knowledge alone will not suffice because
privity and knowledge will also be found "where the owner 'could have
and should have obtained the information by reasonable inquiry or
inspection." 5 In instances where the shipowner is a corporation,
"privity or knowledge means the privity or knowledge of a managing
agent, officer, or supervisory employee.'
Since "supervisory personnel
had offices near the dredging site and were on the site often," the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the dredging
company "could not carry its burden of showing that it had no privity or
knowledge of the negligence." 7 There was no mention of the dredging
company's practice, if any, allowing vessel traffic access to facilities
blocked by the dredging operation. The Eleventh Circuit appears to
have assumed the worst and used that assumption to deny limitation.
Regarding the recoverability of nonpecuniary damages for the
wrongful deaths of nonseamen killed in territorial waters, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the dredging company's
motion for summary judgment."8 The court of appeals noted that the
Supreme Court had recently resolved that question in favor of the
deceased nonseaman.
A shipowner's right to a concursus in a limitation of liability proceeding incurred further disfavor in Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v.
Carletta.'" This case arose when an individual and his fiancee hired
the owner of the M/V Skyrider Express to take them parasailing near
Clearwater Beach, Florida. The vessel pulled the couple aloft by a
parachute that was secured to the vessel by a tow line. When weather
conditions hampered the operator's efforts to retrieve the parasailors, he
severed the tow line, causing them to fall into the water. A gust of wind
caused the parachute to rise on its own, unsecured and uncontrolled by
the vessel operator. Unfortunately, the tow line had become entangled
around one of the parasailors' ankles, allowing the parachute to pull him
into the air hanging upside down. When the parachute drifted over
land, he struck several shoreside objects, sustaining injuries from which
he later died. As a result of the accident, the vessel owner sought
exoneration from or limitation of liability. After approving the vessel

94. Id.

95. Id. (quoting Hercules Carriers,768 F.2d at 1577).
96. Id. (citing Hercules Carriers,768 F.2d at 1574).

97. Id.
98. Id. at 131.
99. Id. at 130 (relying upon Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619
(1996)).
100. 86 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1996).
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owner's security bond and ad interim stipulation, the district court
enjoined the further prosecution of any suits against the vessel owner or
the vessel in any other forum. Pursuant to a public notice, the fiancee,
the estate, and the decedent's children contested the right to limitation
and claimed damages as a result of the accident.'01
Approximately fifteen months later, the claimants instituted a state
court action for personal injury and wrongful death against the
manufacturer of the parasailing equipment, the seller of the parasailing
equipment, an employee of one or both, the operator of the vessel, and
the parasailing instructor. The district court declined to enjoin the state
court action because the claimants did not name the vessel owner as a
party. When the claimants later decided to add the vessel owner as a
party in the state court action, they filed a motion to stay the limitation
of liability proceeding and to lift the injunction."° Along with the
motion, the claimants filed a stipulation intended to protect the owner's
rights under the Limitation of Liability Act."0 3 The magistrate judge
denied the claimants' motion to lift the injunction because of perceived
deficiencies in the stipulation. ° Shortly thereafter, the claimants
filed an amended stipulation addressing the deficiencies identified by the
magistrate. That stipulation had six provisions: (1) exclusive jurisdiction in the district court to determine the owner's right to limitation; (2)
exclusive jurisdiction in the district court to determine the value of the
vessel immediately following the accident; (3) no litigation of either of
the aforementioned issues in any state court and waiver of any res
judicata effect of any state court decisions, rulings, or judgments in
regard thereto; (4) no enforcement of any state court judgment that
would expose the owner to liability in excess of the limitation fund until
after the district court had decided the limitation issue; (5) if the district
court granted limitation, the stipulation established first priority against
the available fund for any claim based upon fees and costs awarded
against the vessel owner in any state court proceeding; and (6) after
payment of the claims in provision (5), established the order of priority
of the other claims against the limitation fund if limitation were
granted. 10 5 The district court stayed the limitation proceeding and
lifted the injunction, allowing claimants to proceed against the vessel
owner in state court."° The appeal ensued.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1034.
Id at 1035.
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-185.
86 F.3d at 1035.
Id. at 1035-36.
Id. at 1036.
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The appeal brought before the Eleventh Circuit for the first time the
inconsistency between the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts
to determine an owner's right to limitation without a jury and the
claimant's right to try his case before a jury pursuant to the saving to
suitors clause.'0 7 The Eleventh Circuit observed that "[iun resolving
this tension, the 'primary concern is to protect the shipowner's absolute
right to claim the Act's liability cap, and to reserve the adjudication of
that right in the federal forum.'"'08 In accommodating the competing
interests of the owner and claimants, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out
two exceptions that allow the claimants to try liability and damages in
a forum of their choice: (1) "where the limitation fund exceeds the
aggregate amount of all the possible claims against the vessel owner"
(often referred to as an "adequate fund case"); and (2) "where there is
only one claimant" (commonly referred to as a "single claimant
case")."° When the limitation fund exceeds all the claims, an owner
will not be exposed to liability in excess of the limitation fund, and the
claimants do not have to compete for a larger portion of an inadequate
fund."
In the single claimant situation, there are no competing
claims to the limitation fund, and upon the filing of a stipulation to
protect the owner's right to determine the limitation issue, the claimant
may proceed in another forum." Having made that analysis, the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that it was presented with a "multipleclaims-inadequate-fund" case.11 2 In simplest terms, the issue before
the court was whether the claimants could "transform a multiple-claimsinadequate-fund case into the functional equivalent of a single claim
case" by means of a stipulation."3 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
if the stipulation precludes the vessel owner from being exposed to
competing judgments in excess of the limitation fund, there was no need
to have a concursus, the same as in a true single claimant case." 4

107. Id. at 1037. The saving to suitors clause provides that the district court of the
United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over: "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994). This is the very same statute that confers
exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and maritime matters on federal courts.
108. 86 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Magnolia Marine Transp. Co. v. Laplace Towing Corp.,
964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992)).
109. Id.
110. Id
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1038.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Using Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn" 5 for the proposition that "claimants in a multiple-claim-inadequate-fund case may file appropriate
stipulations to create an adequate fund case, thereby eliminating the
need for a concursus," the Eleventh Circuit concluded that claimants
"also should be able to make a concursus unnecessary by transforming
their multiple claims into the functional equivalent of a single
claim."'1 The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Pershing Auto Rentals,
Inc. v. Gaffney" 7 on the ground that only two of the four claimants in
that case agreed to the requisite stipulation, meaning that a concursus
was necessary to ensure that the owner was not exposed to competing
judgments that might exceed the limitation fund."' The Eleventh
Circuit also took comfort that the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits had adopted a similar position."9 With that rationale, the
Eleventh Circuit created another exception to the shipowner's right to
a concursus.
The court of appeals then turned its attention to whether the
stipulation had created the functional equivalent of a single claim. In
order to do that, the court had to determine how many claims there
actually were." ° There was no question that the personal injury claim
of the fiancee and the wrongful death claim of the estate were separate
claims.'
The court also recognized the potential for claims of attorney fees or costs against the vessel owner by a claimant or third
party.'22 Although the three separate and competing claims required
a concursus, the Eleventh Circuit declared that problem cured by the
stipulation that established the priority of the competing claims.'23
The vessel owner also contended that its rights were not protected
because the four minor children of the decedent had not signed a
protective stipulation.'2 The court of appeals determined that whether general maritime, Florida, or New York law applied, "[tihere is only
a single claim arising from [the] death, and it belongs to the personal
representative of his estate." 2 5 The Eleventh Circuit concluded "that,
for purposes of the Limitation Act, the existence of minor children does

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120,
121.
122.
123.
-124.
125.

354 U.S. 147 (1957).
86 F.3d at 1039.
279 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1960).
86 F.3d at 1040.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
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not transform the wrongful death cause of action.., from a single claim
situation to one involving multiple claims.""
The court of appeals then addressed whether the possibility of third
party claims against the vessel owner for indemnity or contribution
created a multiple claimant situation requiring a concursus. In
resolving this issue, the Eleventh Circuit noted that there was a split of
authority among the federal courts of appeals-some holding that an
indemnity claim against an owner does not create a multiple claim
situation because "'the indemnity claim is merely derivative of the one
presented by the claimant'," and others holding that potential claims for
contribution or.indemnity against the owner should constitute a multiple
claimant situation requiring a concursus.127 The Eleventh Circuit
found the latter persuasive and held "that the possibility of claims from
[the vessel owner's] state court co-defendants creates a multiple claims
situation."' 2 The Eleventh Circuit then concluded that the "multiple
claims" problem was cured by the fourth provision of the stipulation,
that is, that the claimants would forego enforcement of any state court
judgment against anyone, including the vessel owner's co-defendants,
until the vessel owner's right to limitation had been decided.'
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the stipulation converted the
case "into the functional equivalent of a single claim case."13 0
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit turned its attention to the content of the
stipulation. In reviewing the stipulation, the court expressed three
specific concerns for which it remanded the case to the district court for
evaluation: (1) whether the stipulation fully protected the vessel owner's
claim for limitation of liability exclusively in admiralty; (2) whether the
stipulation protected the vessel "owner from having to pay damages in
excess of the limitation fund, unless and until the admiralty court denies
limited liability"; and (3) whether the stipulation protected the vessel
"owner from litigation by the damage claimants in any forum outside the
limitation proceeding." 1 Regarding the vessel owner's right to try
limitation in admiralty, the Eleventh Circuit required the claimants not
only to waive any res judicata effect of the decisions, rulings, or
judgments of any state court, they also had to waive the defense of issue

126. Id.
127. Id. at 1041-42 (quoting Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale, 595 F.2d 414, 419 (8th
Cir. 1979)).
128. 86 F.3d at 1042.
129. I& at 1043.
130. Id. at 1044.
131. Id.
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preclusion with respect to all limitation issues. 3 2 With respect to the
vessel owner's protection from having to pay damages in excess of the
fund, the Eleventh Circuit directed that the stipulation be clarified to
cover the possible granting of limitation.3 8' Under the pertinent
stipulation, the claimants only had to forego enforcement of any
judgment in excess of the fund until after the vessel owner's right to
limitation was determined, that is, it did not provide what would happen
if limitation were granted." 4 In the case of the provision that afforded
protection to the vessel owner from litigation in any forum outside the
limitation proceeding, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned that the
stipulation referred only to "state court" whereas damage claims could
also be brought in other courts. 8'
In another limitation of liability case, Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v.
Shubert,18 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed another exception allowing
37
claimants to try liability and damages outside the admiralty court.
This case arose out of an accident that occurred during a demonstration
of recreational watercraft by Suzuki. The demonstration was held on
the waterfront property of a customer, and numerous other customers
were invited. The president of Suzuki constructed a slalom course to
demonstrate the watercraft."
At the time of the accident, three
watercraft were traversing the slalom course. One was owned by Suzuki
and operated by a customer with permission from Suzuki's president.
The second watercraft was owned and operated by another customer.
The third watercraft was owned by yet another customer and operated
by another individual. Shubert and two other individuals rode as
passengers on the Suzuki watercraft. For an unknown reason, Shubert
fell into the water while the Suzuki watercraft made its way through the
slalom course. The second watercraft avoided striking Shubert, but the
third hit Shubert, causing him serious and permanent injuries."
Shubert and his wife brought suit in Florida state court against
Suzuki, its president, the operator of its watercraft, the other two
passengers on its watercraft, the owner and operator of the second
watercraft, and the operator of the third watercraft. The basis of the
complaint was that Suzuki negligently supervised the demonstration.
Almost five months later, Suzuki petitioned for limitation of its liability.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (i.e., the law side of the federal district court).

136. 86 F.3d 1060 (11th Cir. 1996).
137. Id. at 1060.
138. I& at 1061.
139. Id. at 1062.
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The Shuberts filed their answer and claim for damages. No other claims
were filed. The Shuberts moved for summary judgment on the ground
that Suzuki was not entitled to limitation because the accident was
caused by the direct negligence of its president."4 The district court
agreed, reasoning that "if the state court holds Suzuki liable for the
accident, Suzuki's liability would derive solely from [its presidents]
actions .... [Its president] necessarily has privity and knowledge of his
own actions, and... [the president's] privity and knowledge is the same
as Suzuki's."'4 ' The appeal ensued.
In its analysis, the court of appeals again acknowledged "the tension
between the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over Limitation Act claims
and the presumption favoring jury trials under the saving to suitors
clause." 42 The court noted three exceptions to exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction: (1) adequate fund cases, (2) single claimant cases, and (3)
multiple-claims-inadequate-fund cases in which stipulations were used
to create the functional equivalent of a single claimant case." The
Eleventh Circuit then referred to another way to preserve the claimant's
right to a jury trial, that is, "where it is apparent that limitation cannot
be granted."'" The Eleventh Circuit's rationale was simple, "[w]here
no grant of limitation is possible, the basis for granting exoneration
vanishes." 45 Relying on precedent, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that the admiralty court may decide the privity or knowledge issue
without first deciding the liability issue-at least where the boat owner
concedes privity or knowledge, or where it is otherwise impossible
under any set of circumstances for the vessel owner to demonstrate the
absence of privity or knowledge. 4
With that rule firmly in mind, the court of appeals turned its attention
to the privity or knowledge issue. The Eleventh Circuit traced the
development of "privity and knowledge," beginning with the basic
principle initially accepted by the courts that "'privity or knowledge'
generally refers to the vessel owner's personal participation in, or actual
knowledge of, the specific acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness which caused or contributed to the accident." 47 The court then
pointed out that the definition of privity or knowledge had been
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id at 1065.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1063 n.2.
Id. (quoting Fecht v. Makowski, 406 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1969)).

145. Id. at 1064 (quoting Fecht, 406 F.2d at 722-23).

146. Id.
147. Id.
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broadened "to include constructive knowledge-what the vessel owner
could have discovered through reasonable inquiry."'4 The court of
appeals then alluded to the difference between managerial employees
and ministerial employees of a corporation and concluded that "the
privity and knowledge of... Suzuki's president, clearly constitutes the
privity and knowledge of Suzuki." 49
In analyzing the district court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Suzuki's rights under the Limitation Act were not
adequately protected."W Although the court of appeals acknowledged
that Suzuki possessed privity and knowledge with respect to all of the
acts of its president, it was not convinced that Suzuki could be held
vicariously liable only through its president, particularly at that stage
of the proceedings.'' The Eleventh Circuit postulated that it was
possible for Suzuki to be held liable through the acts of the nonemployee
operator of its watercraft and that Suzuki could lack privity or knowledge of the operator's negligence.'5 2 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
held "that the possibility of vicarious liability through parties other than
[Suzuki's president] precludes summary judgment."'
The Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded by the Shuberts' argument
that their state court complaint did not allege that Suzuki was
vicariously liable for anyone's conduct other than its president's.'" It
was the possibility of Suzuki's vicarious liability arising from the actions
of someone other than its president that troubled the Eleventh
Circuit.' The court of appeals was also concerned with the possibility
that the non-Suzuki defendants might file cross-claims against Suzuki
for indemnification or contribution on the ground that Suzuki was
vicariously liable through a person other than its president.1" In
closing, the court invited the claimants to file appropriate protective
stipulations as in Beiswenger.57 If a protective stipulation is all that
is needed to obtain a jury trial in the claimant's choice of forum, it
appears that the exceptions have consumed the rule.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1065.
150. Id at 1066.
151. Id. at 1065. In reaching its decision, the district court had before it the pleadings
in the limitation action, the complaint filed in the state court action, and the deposition of
Suzuki's president. The Eleventh Circuit felt that it was too early to reach that result on
too few facts. Id. at 1065 n.4, 1066.
152. Id. at 1066.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id
157. Id.
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MARINE INSURANCE
Although the appeal in Hilton Oil Transport v. Jonas' turned on
the existence of genuine issues of material fact, the heart of the
controversy was a "held covered" clause in a marine insurance policy. 159 This case arose when the barge Hilton, which was moored at a
berth that was unsafe in heavy weather, broke her mooring lines during
a storm and ended up in an area of rock rip-rap where she became a
constructive total loss. The owner had procured hull and machinery
insurance on the barge from Underwriters at Lloyds, which had the
following trading limits: "'Limited to East Coast of USA, Gulf of Mexico
and the West Indies or held covered.'"'" Pursuant to a charter, the
barge was towed from Amuay, Venezuela to Puerto Cortes, Honduras.
A month later the barge was towed to Puerto Castilla, Honduras, where
she was berthed until the fatal storm struck. She had been unable to
leave because of a dispute with the Honduran government.'
The owner never advised its New York broker, its London broker, or
Underwriters of the voyages to Puerto Cortes, Honduras; never
requested the barge be "held covered" for the voyages; and never agreed
to pay any additional premium. When the owner made a claim against
Underwriters for the constructive total loss of the barge, Underwriters
denied coverage. The owner brought suit in the district court to recover
for the constructive total loss of the barge. In keeping with its previous
denial of coverage, Underwriters again denied coverage because the
barge was outside of the trading limits specified by the hull and
machinery insurance.' s2 On cross-motions for partial summary
judgment as to liability, the district court held that although the loss
occurred outside of the trading limits warranty, there was coverage
under the "held covered" clause."6 A bench trial was later held on
damages, and the appeal followed.
VI.

158. 75 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 1996).
159. Id. at 629.
160. Id
161. Id.
162. Id. Underwriters based their denial of coverage on other grounds as well-failure
to have the barge certified by the U.S. Coast Guard, policy exclusions based on losses
caused by arrest and detainment, war risks and strike clauses, and the owner's breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing-all of which the court of appeals found to be
meritless. Id. at 629 n.1.
163. Id. at 629. The district court applied state law because once it learned there was
a "held covered" clause, it determined that there was "no firmly established federal
admiralty law governing held covered cases'" and that Wilburn Boat Co. v.Fireman'sFund
Insurance Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955), required such application. 75 F.3d at 630.

1372

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Although the appeal turned on the question of whether there were
issues of disputed fact, the liability of Underwriters turned on whether
the "held covered" clause was applicable. If there had been a willful or
intentional breach of the trading limits without notice to Underwriters,
the owner could not receive the benefits of the "held covered" clause.'"
Quoting the Ninth Circuit opinion in Campbell v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., written by Judge (now Mr. Justice) Kennedy, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that "'[bly including the clause ['held covered'],
the insurer accepts the greater risk occasioned by a possible failure to
comply with those warranties, on condition that the breach is not wilful,
the assured gives prompt notice in the event a breach occurs and agrees
to pay an additional premium. ' " " The Eleventh Circuit reversed and
remanded the matter to the district court because there was a factual
dispute between the parties that the district court did not and should
not have resolved.1 Underwriters contended that the owner's managing director intentionally breached the trading limits warranty whereas
the managing director claimed that although he knew the barge was in
Honduras at the7 time of the casualty, he thought that was within the
trading limits.16
The Eleventh Circuit addressed one other issue. Pursuant to the sue
and labor clause of the policy, the owner took steps to mitigate the
damage from a covered peril. The owner received $583,000 from the
charterer as a result of a successful arbitration. The charterer satisfied
the arbitration award by depositing the funds in an interpleader action
Underwriters contended that if
in the federal court in Houston."
they were ultimately liable to the owner for damages to the barge, they
were "entitled to a credit or setoff from the amount recovered by [the
owner] from [the charterer.""6 On the other hand, the owner contended that if Underwriters were liable for damage to the barge, they must
fie their claim in the interpleader action. 170 The Eleventh Circuit held
that in the event of liability of Underwriters, who would then be
responsible for the reasonable sue and labor expenses, they did not have
to file a claim in the interpleader action but were automatically entitled

164. 75 F.3d at 629-30.
165. Id. at 630 (quoting Campbell v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 496, 497-98 (9th
Cir. 1976)).
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Id.
169. Id at 630-31.
170. Id. at 631.
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against the amount otherwise recoverable by [the ownto a 17"setoff
1
er]."
VII.

MARITIME LIENS

Although the issues on appeal involved the award of interest and
172
attorney fees, Marine Coatings of Alabama, Inc. v. United States
arose in the context of a maritime lien. On appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit for the third time, the court decided whether the Suits in
Admiralty Act 73 or the Public Vessels Act 74 applied in a case in
which a ship repair subcontractor performed repair services on a naval
vessel. 17 After the second appeal, a bench trial was held in the
district court in which the subcontractor recovered a judgment against
the United States for work performed on three naval vessels. In its
judgment, the district court included an award of prejudgment interest
and attorney fees. 76 On appeal the Government challenged those two
awards.
Regarding the award of interest, the issues centered around whether
the suit was governed by the Public Vessels Act, which does not provide
in Admiralty Act, which does
for the recovery of interest, or the Suits
177
provide for the recovery of interest.
Before addressing the Government's contention, the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed the history surrounding the two statutes. It began with the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, which provides that "the
78
United States cannot be sued in admiralty without its consent."
Likewise, "the Government's property [is not] subject to in rem
proceedings in a court of admiralty." 7 9 Prior to 1916, when Congress
passed the Shipping Act, the only relief available to those injured by a
government-owned vessel was to obtain a private bill from Congress
authorizing suit."s When Congress became inundated with private
claims arising from the Government's ownership of a substantial
merchant fleet in World War I, Congress passed the Shipping Act,
"which provided that Government-owned vessels 'while employed solely

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
71 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1996).
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1994).
Id. §§ 781-790 (1994).
71 F.3d at 1559.
Id. at 1560.
Id.

178. Id.

179. Id.
180. Id.
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as merchant vessels shall be subject to all laws, regulations, and
liabilities governing merchant vessels .... '"181 After the Supreme
5 2 that the Shipping Act allowed in
Court held in The Lake Monroe"
rem proceedings against government vessels, Congress passed the Suits
Since that Act
in Admiralty Act in 1920 to prevent such actions.'
applied only to merchant vessels owned by the Government, public
With
vessels still enjoyed the Government's sovereign immunity.'
the passage of the Public Vessels Act in 1925, Congress extended the
right to sue the United States to claims involving public vessels."s In
1960 Congress amended the Suits in Admiralty Act by repealing the
"merchant vessel" language, "thus expanding the coverage of that Act to
Since
claims against the United States involving public vessels."'
Congress followed this twisted route to afford relief to claims against all
government vessels, the Eleventh Circuit noted:
Claims that fall "within the scope of the Public Vessels Act remain
subject to its terms after the 1960 amendment to the Suits in Admiralty Act" .... This means that in a case that is covered by the Public
Vessels Act--a case that would now appear to be covered by both
acts--only the provisions of the Public Vessels Act are applied."8 7
In addressing the Government's contention that the Public Vessels Act
applied and therefore interest was barred, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that there was no contract that provided for prejudgment interest."s
Accordingly, the court of appeals had to decide whether the subcontractor's claims fell within the scope of the Public Vessels Act."8 9 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court had premised its award of
interest on the Suits in Admiralty Act because the subcontractor had
alleged that the Suits in Admiralty Act governed the sovereign immunity
issue."9 The Eleventh Circuit rejected that as a basis upon which to
award interest. 91 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the Government's
contention "that any claim involving a public vessel brought in personam
against the United States on in rem principles is a claim governed by

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. (quoting The Shipping Act, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916)).
The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246 (1919).
71 F.3d at 1560.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1560-61.
Id. at 1561.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
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Instead, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the Public Vessels Act."'
the Public Vessels Act "lifts the Government's sovereign immunity only
for claims 'for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States,
and for compensation for towage and salvage services .... "'
The primary obstacle that Marine Coatings faced on appeal was the
holding by the Eleventh Circuit in Stevens Technical Services v. United
States,'" a case involving a similar claim, in which the court stated
"[wie hold: [The Public Vessels Act] applies to and controls this public
vessel case. [The Public Vessels Act] controls with all of its restrictive
provisions." 9 ' The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Stevens Technical
Services, resolving that argument against the Government by saying:
We were not faced, however, with the question of whether the claim in
that case did or did not fall under the provisions of § 781 of the Public
Vessels Act, but rather whether the no-lien provisions of § 788 barred
the claim .... Thus, the question of whether [the subcontractor's]
claim falls within the Public Vessels Act is still an open one.'
The Eleventh Circuit noted that there was no question that the three
The court then traced the case
ships involved were public vessels.'
by
a public vessel" as provided in
caused
"damages
interpreting
history
the Public Vessels Act. The court of appeals noted that in Canadian
Aviator, Ltd. v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court did
not limit the application of the Public Vessels Act "to cases in which a
public vessel is the 'physical instrument' that caused 'physical damage.' '199 Accordingly, the Supreme Court extended the Act to a case
involving damage to a private ship when a public vessel negligently led
it to strike a submerged wreck.' ° The Eleventh Circuit also observed
that the Supreme Court expanded the Act's coverage "to include a claim
for personal injuries suffered by a longshoreman aboard a public
vessel."20 '

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id. at 1562 (citing Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 781 (1994)).
913 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1527.
71 F.3d at 1562 n.5.
Id. at 1561 n.4.
324 U.S. 215 (1945).
71 F.3d at 1562 (quoting CanadianAviator, 324 U.S. at 224).
324 U.S. at 228-29.
American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 454 (1947).
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The Eleventh Circuit then analyzed the claim of the subcontractor and
In finding
found that it arose under the Federal Maritime Lien Act.'
that such an action did not fall within the purview of the Public Vessels
Act, the Eleventh Circuit determined:
[1It [was] not literally an action for "damages caused by a public
vessel," since the "damages" in this case resulted from a failure by [the
prime contractor] and the Government to pay [the subcontractor] for
the repair work, not from any negligent act by a ship or its crew.
Second, it is not an action for "compensation for towage and salvage
services, including contract salvage, rendered to a public vessel of the
United States."=3
The court of appeals reasoned that "[tihe specific inclusion of particular
contract claims [towage and salvage services, including contract salvage]
would be meaningless if the 'damages' provision extended to maritime
contract claims in general.' °
Since the court of appeals held that the subcontractor's claim was not
authorized by the Public Vessels Act, it "[fell] within that 'category of
claims involving public vessels [that is] beyond the scope of the Public
Vessels Act,'... and, as such, are covered only by the Suits in Admiralty
Act."205 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award of
prejudgment interest by the district court.2
The district court had also awarded attorney fees pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act,2"7 finding "that the Government was not
'substantially justified' in proceeding to trial .... .'
The Eleventh
Circuit found that the second appeal did not resolve the factual
questions; therefore, it was appropriate to resolve such questions at a
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the award of
trial.2"
Accordingly,
210
attorney fees.

202. 71 F.3d at 1563; 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-975 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 31341-31343 (1994)).
203. 71 F.3d at 1563 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 781).
204. Id. at 1564.
205. Id. (quoting United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164,180-81
(1976)).
206. Id.

207. Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title 11, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
208. 71 F.3d at 1564.
209. Id at 1564-65.
210. Id. at 1565.
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VIII. PREFERRED SHIP MORTGAGE
In Dietrich v. Key Bank, NA., 21' the Eleventh Circuit dispelled the
clouds of doubt created by American National Trust & Savings Ass'n v.
Fogle"l when the court came squarely to grips with whether the Ship
Mortgage Act 21 provides the exclusive procedures for the enforcement
of preferred ship mortgage hens, that is, whether the parties to such
mortgages may contract for the use of state self-help repossession and
resale procedures.21
The Eleventh Circuit was the first court of
appeals to address this issue. The court's decision that the use of selfhelp remedies is not prohibited by the Ship Mortgage Act, when provided
by contract, is a decision welcomed by financial institutions that can now
avoid the costly procedures of a Marshal's sale when there are no
competing maritime liens.
The case arose out of the bank's financing the purchase of a Mako
sport fishing vessel. The borrower signed a security agreement to
protect the bank until the first preferred ship mortgage was in place.
The mortgage was obtained about a year later. Three years later, the
borrower defaulted on the note. In accordance with the terms of the loan
documents, the bank accelerated the note and peacefully repossessed the
vessel, which was ultimately sold at a private sale. Subsequently, the
borrower filed suit in state court against the bank for breach of contract
and conversion. The bank removed the action and counterclaimed for a
deficiency judgment.2 1 In response the borrower moved for partial
summary judgment on the counterclaim on the ground that the Ship
Mortgage Act prohibited the bank from using any self-help remedies. 16
As a secondary position, the borrower argued that even if it were lawful
to contract for a self-help remedy, the relevant contracts did not so
provide.217 The district court found against the borrower and entered
a deficiency judgment.1 8 On appeal the borrower asserted the same
grounds as error.

211. 72 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1996).
212. 637 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
213. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-31343 (West Supp. 1994). Although the former version, 46
U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1975), was in effect when the controversy arose, for purposes of the
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit referred to the current version because none of the substantive
changes made in the 1988 reorganization of the Ship Mortgage Act had any effect on the
issues on appeal.
214. 72 F.3d at 1517.
215. Id. at 1511.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1512.
218. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the construction of the underlying
contracts to determine whether they provided for state law self-help
repossession and sale.219 There was no contest that the mortgage was
In concluding that the
validly recorded, perfected, and governed.'
contracts allowed for self-help repossession and sale, the Eleventh
Circuit relied upon three paragraphs in the mortgage that expressly
provided for repossession and two paragraphs that expressly referred to
resale after repossession.221 The language relied upon by the Eleventh
Circuit should be found in most mortgages; for example: "If you
repossess the Vessel"; "[miake all necessary transfers of the Vessel upon
resale after repossession"; and "carry out a resale of the Vessel in the
event it becomes necessary for [the mortgagee] to repossess it." The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that this language "unequivocally anticipates
both self-help repossession and self-help resale."'
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to whether the Ship Mortgage Act
precluded such remedies. In response to the borrower's argument that
the statutory provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act were exclusive and
therefore preempted state law remedies, the court of appeals conceded
that section 31307 of the Act preempted any state statutes that purport
to create a maritime lien for necessaries that could be enforced in rem
in admiralty.224 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the borrower's argu-

ment that such limited preemption affected the self-help remedies before
the court. 2s In fact, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]he Ship
Mortgage Act contains no direct expression of congressional intent 2to
2
preempt state law allowing for self-help repossession and resale." 1
In light of that silence, the question before the Eleventh Circuit was
whether the enforcement provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act preempted
state law. In addressing that issue, the court of appeals used the
guidance furnished by the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.,227 in which the Court stated, "In the absence of an

express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law
actually conflicts with federal law ... or if federal law so thoroughly

occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that

219. Id.
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Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."' Finding no
express congressional command, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded to
analyze whether state self-help repossession and sale conflicted with
federal law.2" The Eleventh Circuit first considered whether the state
law actually conflicted with the federal statute. In making that
determination, the Eleventh Circuit employed the standards set forth by
the Supreme Court in Hillsborough County, Florida v.Automated
Medical Laboratories,Inc.' ° In that case, the Supreme Court held
there was a conflict if "'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,' .., or when state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." The Eleventh Circuit observed that the Ship
Mortgage Act provides procedures for judicial foreclosure and sale, but
nowhere does it describe the procedures to be used by the parties to a
preferred ship mortgage who seek to enforce the mortgage by self-help
remedies without judicial assistance.2 2 Accordingly, no direct conflict
existed.2 a Since the purpose of the Ship Mortgage Act "was to create
a means of enforcing mortgages in admiralty in order to promote ship
financing," the Eleventh Circuit found that "supplementation through
state law furthers the objectives of Congress by providing another
avenue for enforcement of vessel mortgage liens.'
The Eleventh Circuit then analyzed "whether Congress intended to
occupy the field." 3 5 The Eleventh Circuit observed that there were
three bases upon which it could infer an intent to preempt: (1) "where
the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation
by the States"; (2) "where the federal interest in the field is sufficiently
dominant"; and (3) "where 'the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it' reveal a
purpose to preclude the enforcement of the state laws on the same
subject."n
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the federal law was not so
pervasive that it thoroughly occupied the field "[b]ecause the language
of the Act is permissive-i.e., the Act uses the permissive 'may' rather
than exclusive 'must' with respect to its enforcement procedures-and
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

72 F.3d at 1513-14 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516).
Id.
471 U.S. 707 (1985).
72 F.3d at 1513 (quoting Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713).
Id at 1514.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988)).
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because the Act is silent with respect to self-help repossession and
sale."237 The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the enforcement of
preferred mortgage liens "is not the sort of uniquely federal interest
which is so dominant it would create an inference that Congress
Likewise, the Eleventh
intended to preempt state law in that field.'
Circuit did not view self-help repossession and sale as a serious danger
to the administration of the federal program. 9 Regarding the last
basis, the Eleventh Circuit concluded:
[N]either the object sought to be obtained by the Act, i.e., preferred
status of mortgage liens enforceable in admiralty, nor the obligations
imposed by the statute, i.e., various statutory conditions and documentation requirements, indicate that Congress's purpose was to preclude
state law enforcement of preferred mortgages in the manner proposed
in this case.'
When those arguments failed, the borrower contended that circuit
precedent in J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. The Vessel Morning Star 1
and Nat G. HarrisonOverseas Corp. v. American Barge Sun Coaster'
controlled.2" The court of appeals distinguished McDermott because
it involved a situation in which McDermott sought to supplement the
statutory provisions for a judicial sale of a vessel, whereas in the instant
case the mortgagee chose a self-help remedy rather than judicial
foreclosure and sale.2' The Eleventh Circuit rejected the application
of Nat G.HarrisonOverseas Corp. because it involved a direct conflict
between federal and state law-whether the rate of interest was
governed by Georgia usury laws or the open-ended, agreed-upon-rate
provided for in the Ship Mortgage Act.245
In holding that the Ship Mortgage Act does not preclude state law selfhelp remedies when provided for by contract, the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that its holding was in conflict with Bank of American
National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Fogle.'4 In view of the congressional purpose "to facilitate and promote financing for vessels, and in

237. Id. at 1515.
238. Id. at 1514.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1515.
241. 457 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
242. 475 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1974).
243. 72 F.3d at 1516.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1516-17. Section 31322(b) of Title 46 provides: "A preferred mortgage filed
or recorded under this chapter may have any rate of interest that the parties to the
mortgage agree to." 46 U.S.C.A. § 31322(b).
246. 72 F.3d at 1517.
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particular to provide an effective means for enforcing ship mortgages,"
the Eleventh Circuit opined that its holding was "consistent with and
Its holding did not mandate but
supportive of that purpose."' 7
recognized the availability of an optional remedy.' 4 This decision will
no doubt lay to rest many concerns that have arisen about state law selfhelp remedies in the wake of Fogle.
IX. SEAMEN
In Kasprik v. United States, 49 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the exclusivity provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act
("SAA") barred a seaman from bringing an action against an agent
of the United States for arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance
and cure.2 1 The seaman was employed by the United States as a
second class assistant engineer aboard a vessel owned by the United
States through the Maritime Administration and operated pursuant to
contract by two private entities. The seaman was injured when he
manually tried to engage the turning gear lever of the main engine. The
seaman sued the United States for his injury and the United States and
the two private contract operators for the arbitrary and willful failure to
pay his maintenance and cure.262 When the contract operators moved
to dismiss the suit on the ground that the claim was "barred by the
exclusivity provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act," the district court
agreed and dismissed the suit against the contract operators.m
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted that the issue of "whether the
exclusivity provision of the SAA prevents a seaman from seeking
punitive damages from an agent of the United States for arbitrary and
willful denial of maintenance and cure" was one of first impression in
the circuit.2 " There was no question that the seaman was entitled to
maintenance and cure. The seaman urged the Eleventh Circuit to apply
Hines v. J. A. LaPorte, Inc.,2 which held that in a proper case, the
seaman could recover both reasonable attorney fees and punitive
damages from a private vessel owner who arbitrarily and willfully

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253..
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255.

Id.
Id.
87 F.3d 462 (11th Cir. 1996).
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
87 F.3d at 464.
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denied maintenance and cure.'" The court of appeals distinguished
Hines because the instant action was against an operator of a vessel
owned by the United States and not a private vessel owner. 5" The
Eleventh Circuit referred to the specific statutory language in section
745, which provides that "'[wihere a remedy is provided under this
chapter it shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action by reason of
the same subject matter.... . 2 The court of appeals concluded that
a seaman's claim for failure to pay maintenance and cure arises from
"the seaman's entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from his
injury" aboard the ship.5 9 The Eleventh Circuit reached that result
because of the phrase "by reason of the same subject matter."2 In its
view, a claim for failure to pay maintenance and cure, or for arbitrary
and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure, fell within the ambit of
that phrase because all such claims arose out of the seaman's entitlement to maintenance and cure resulting from his injury 261

The

Eleventh Circuit noted that "[s]overeign immunity has not been waived
with respect to punitive damages. 6 2 This led the court to opine that
a seaman's claim against an agent of the United States for "the arbitrary
and willful denial of maintenance and cure has been effectively abolished
by Congress under the exclusivity provision of the SAA."2 Since the
result reached by the Eleventh Circuit "gives private operators managing
ships owned by the United States the ability to willfully and arbitrarily
deny maintenance and cure without suffering any consequences," the
Eleventh Circuit invited Congress to change the law if the holding was
erroneous.2 ' The seaman was relegated to making his claim against
the United States, and it would be only for maintenance and cure.2'
In Isbrandtsen Marine Services, Inc. v. MIV Inagua Tania,2 1 the
court of appeals had to address the propriety of a district court's order
denying alien crew members the right to intervene in an in rem
admiralty action. 7 The vessel was of Honduran registry with a crew
from Central and South America. A lien claimant had the vessel

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
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Id. at 1189.
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Id. at 465 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 745).
Id. at 466.
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Id. at 465.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 466 n.2.
Id at 466.
93 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 1996).
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arrested on March 1, 1995, in Port Everglades. After the appointment
of a substitute custodian, the vessel was moved to an offshore anchorage
with her crew aboard. The day after the arrest, the vessel owner filed
a claim and an emergency motion for a post-arrest hearing. Before the
hearing, the lien claimant filed a second amended complaint that almost
doubled its lien claim and added in personam claims against the vessel
After the magistrate judge set the release
owner and charterer.'
bond, the lien claimant moved for an interlocutory sale of the vessel.269
On March 24, 1995, the district court allowed a second lien claimant to
intervene, but when the district court learned that the claimant had not
complied with the local rules by preparing a supplemental warrant of
arrest, it vacated the order allowing the intervention.7 0 The crew
members claimed that although they knew the vessel was under arrest,
they had been repeatedly assured by the original lien claimant and the
substitute custodian that the dispute would be resolved. For this reason,
the crew members asserted that they were not worried about their
situation. Fifty-eight days after the arrest, the district court ordered
that an interlocutory sale of the vessel take place eighteen days
2 1
As a result of filing a supplemental warrant of arrest, the
thereafterY.
second lien claimant was allowed to intervene again five days prior to
On the day the sale took place, an attorney "filed an
the sale. 2
intervenors' 'Notice of Maritime Liens and Motion to Enforce 46 U.S.C.
§§ 971, [sic] Maritime Lien'" on behalf of twelve crew members and a
number of other suppliers of necessaries.2 7 '
The day after the sale, the district court denied intervention to the
twelve crew members and other suppliers because they had failed to file
intervening complaints required by the local rules leaving the court
without jurisdiction to entertain the notices of maritime liens and
motions to enforce. 274 The district court also supported its denial by
holding that even if the intervenors were properly before the court,
denial was proper because they failed to comply with the local rules
regarding permissive intervention. 275 The crew members then moved
to set aside the sale and asked "for emergency interim relief... to file
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275. Id. The crew members' automatic right to intervene had expired under the local
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as priority creditors."'
The crew members supported their motion
with a number of arguments: their claim was superior to the others;
they had not been given proper notice of the sale; they learned about the
sale only two days prior thereto (when they retained counsel); they had
not been paid since the vessel had been arrested; and they were not
financially able to return home or maintain themselves. 2" The district
court denied the application for emergency relief; the crew members
were not entitled to automatic intervention because the intervention had
not been sought more than fifteen days before the sale of the vessel.27
Further, the district court did not allow a permissive intervention
because it "would not be equitable to the interest of all parties." 7
Thus, the district court did not consider the petition of the crew
members to set aside the sale because they were not properly before the
court. 28 On June 15, 1995, counsel for the crew members renewed
their motion, which was again denied for lack of jurisdiction."s Six
days later, the district court confirmed the sale of the vessel, the
proceeds of which had been deposited in the registry.' The disbursement of the proceeds of the sale was stayed pending the appeal.2
The Eleventh Circuit quickly disposed of two jurisdictional issues: (1)
the court had jurisdiction because the sale proceeds were still in the
registry of the court, that is, that the funds were substituted for the
vessel; and (2) an interlocutory order denying intervention determines
the rights and liabilities of the parties
and is therefore appealable
24
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).
The Eleventh Circuit then stressed that seamen are wards of
admiralty in need of protection .by the federal courts.' The court also
questioned the role of the original lien claimant, the substitute
custodian, and the owner in causing the delay in the seamen's attempted
intervention.'
The Eleventh Circuit had no information about when
the crew members first learned the vessel was to be sold. 7 In view
of these concerns and the fact that seamen are wards of the admiralty,

276.
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the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's order dismissing the
notice filed by the crew members constituted an abuse of discretion.'
The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that while "[d]enial of a motion to
intervene due to procedural deficiencies would not normally constitute
an abuse of discretion," it rose to that level because "the District Court
ordered an interlocutory sale of the vessel-often the only asset against
which seamen can proceed to enforce their claims."' Moreover, the
Eleventh Circuit believed that the notice of lien and motion to enforce
the lien could "fairly be construed as a motion to intervene and a
complaint.'
The Eleventh Circuit also thought that the district
court should have given the crew members at least one chance to amend
their request to intervene.29 ' The court of appeals also rejected the
original lien claimants' argument that the case was moot because the
The court still
final rights to the proceeds had not been decided.'
had jurisdiction because the proceeds of the sale were still in the registry
of the court as a substitute for the vessel.2w
In Hutchins v. Tennessee Valley Authority,' the Eleventh Circuit
was asked to reverse binding precedent when faced with a question
regarding the exclusivity provisions of the Federal Employees Compensation Act ("FECA). 295 The plaintiff's decedent had drowned while
working as a deckhand at TVA's Widows Creek Fossil Plant on the
Tennessee River in Alabama. The decedent's widow brought suit as his
personal representative and asserted a Jones Act claim. The district
court dismissed the wrongful death action as barred by the exclusivity
provision of FECA. 29
The personal representative faced overwhelming odds in view of
United States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent.n 7 The
personal representative attempted to distinguish the two leading
Supreme Court cases by arguing that they were brought directly against
the United States and not against a government corporation, TVA, the

288. Id. at 734.
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immunity of which had been specifically waived in the TVA Act.'
Even if the Eleventh Circuit had found the Supreme Court precedent
inconclusive on the issue, the Eleventh Circuit was required to follow its
own precedent, which held "that FECA is the exclusive remedy for an
injured seaman employed by the TVA.' 9 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the personal representative's plea that the court reject its prior
case law in favor of permitting suit against the TVA under "plain
reading of the Jones Act,' ° saying that could only be done by the
court en banc. °
In Larue v. Joann M.," a seaman employed as a deckhand on a tug
was injured when a two hundred pound tow line was suddenly released
from a vessel it was assisting to berth, fell approximately thirty feet, and
struck the seaman."'3 The seaman did not assert a Jones Act"
claim, but brought suit on a negligence theory based on general
The
maritime law against the vessel owner in Florida state court.'
action was removed to the district court where the shipowner filed a
third party complaint against the tug owner for contribution and
The tug owner in turn counterclaimed against the
indemnity.'
shipowner for contribution and indemnity, which was dismissed by the
district court.' By agreement the parties submitted the entire case,
including the admiralty claims of contribution and indemnity, to the
jury, which found that the shipowner was one hundred percent negligent
and returned a verdict for the seaman against the shipowner.-" After
the district court denied the shipowner's post-trial motions for judgment
as a matter of law and for a new trial, it entered a judgment on the
verdict against the shipowner and a take-nothing judgment against the
shipowner on its contribution and indemnity claim against the tug
The judgment also allowed the tug owner to recover its
owner.'
maintenance and cure payments to the seaman as well as its payments
in settlement of the seaman's claims against it.31 After the shipowner
appealed, it settled with the seaman, leaving only the shipowner's claim
298. 98 F.3d at 603.
299. Id. (citing Flippo, 486 F.2d 612, and Posey, 93 F.2d 726).
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against the tug owner for indemnity and contribution and the tug
owner's counterclaim against the shipowner for contribution for review
by the Eleventh Circuit."
The shipowner raised three issues on appeal: (1) improper jury
argument by counsel for the tug owner; (2) refusal of the district court
to give a requested jury charge; and (3) failure to enter judgment in
favor of the shipowner on its claim for indemnity against the tug
owner.3 "2 The shipowner claimed that counsel for the tug owner had
unduly prejudiced the jury by arguing that the members of the ship's
The Eleventh
crew who released the tow line were foreigners."
Circuit found that it was the shipowner who initially brought up that
issue when it argued to the jury that the crew members of the ship were
Filipinos who may have misunderstood the English used by the tug
crew.314 The Eleventh Circuit found that the "overriding deficiency"
in the shipowner's argument was that it failed to preserve the issue for
appeal because its counsel had not objected to the comments.3 15
Regarding the refused jury charge, the shipowner had sought the benefit
of the Jones Act statutory standard of negligence in its contribution and
indemnity claim against the tug owner.8 "6 The district court had
rejected that standard in favor of the general maritime law negligence
standard that governed the seaman's negligence claim against the
shipowner.317 Although this issue was one of first impression for the
Eleventh Circuit, it avoided a decision on that basis by finding that the
proposed jury instruction was "confusing and misleading." 8 ' The
Eleventh Circuit also found that because the parties had agreed to a jury
determination of the allocation of fault, the jury verdict could be fairly
read to find that the shipowner was one hundred percent at fault. 1 '
In that event, the tug owner was wholly free from fault, and the
standards of causation relating to its fault had no application. This was
also the basis of the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the shipowner's
contention related to the district court's denial of the shipowner's
indemnity action against the tug owner.320 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that the jury finding of one hundred percent negligence of the
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shipowner "the possibility that [the tug owner] engaged in conduct that
'prevented or seriously hampered [the shipowner's] performance of its
3 21
duty in accordance with the warranty of workmanlike service.'"

321. Id. (quoting Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp., 788 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1986)).

